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[Crim. No. 11533. In Bank. Feb. 28,1968] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GENOVEVO 
ROSALES, Defendant and Appellant. 
[la-ld] Arrest-Without Warrant-Compliance With Law-Effect 
of Failure.-The arrest of defendant by a parole officer and 
three other officers was justified by the suspension of his parole 
and the order of the Adult Authority that he be returned to 
custody (Pen. Code, §§ 3060,3061), but his arrest, at the house 
where they had reason to believe he would be, was vitiated, 
where the officers, none of whom were known to defendant, 
failed to explain their purpose or demand admittance (Pen. 
Code, § 844), but opened the door, which was unlocked, and 
walked straight in, and where there was no evidence to justify 
a belief that compliance with Pen. Code, § 844, would have 
increased the officers' peril, frustrated the an-est, or resulted 
in the destruction of evidence. 
[2] Id.-Without Warrant-Making Known Official Character.-
For a police officer merely to identify himself as such before 
entering a house to make an an-est could constitute substantial 
compliance with Pen. Code, § 844, only if the sun-ounding cir-
cumstances made the officers' purpose clear to the occupants 
or showed that a demand for admittance would be futile; 
thus, there was no substantial compliance where a parole 
officer and three other officers, about to make an indoors an-est 
of defendant, merely told a girl who passed them at the en-
trance that they were police officers, without announcing their 
purpose or demanding entry before going in. 
I. 
t [1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Rev., Arrest, § 42; Am.Jur.2d, Arrest, § 69 
etseq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1,3-6] An-est, § 13; [2] Arrest, § 14. 
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[3] IeL-Without Warrant-Compliance With Law-"Breaking."-
Pen. Code, § 844, requiring admittance to be demanded and ex-
plained by a peace officer before he may break into a house to 
make an arrest, is a codification of the common law, and at 
the very least precludes unannounced entries that would be 
considered "breaking" as that term is used in defining common 
law burglary .. Thus, opening a door or window, even if not 
locked, or not even latched, or pulling open a screen door held 
closed only by a spring, is a "breaking" within the meaning 
of the statute (disapproving, to the extent contrary hereto, 
People v. Feeley (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 100, 105 [3 Cal.Rptr. 
529]). 
[4] Id.-Without Warrant-Compliance With Law-Parole Viola-
tors.-An order to retake a parolee must be executed in ''like 
manner as ordinary criminal process" (Pen. Code, § 3061), and 
thus, in the making of a house arrest, the fact that the 
arrestee, as a parole violator, was an "escape and fugitive 
from justicl;l" under Pen. Code, § 3064, did not excuse noncom-
pliance with Pen. Code, § 844, requiring the police to demand 
and explain their admittance before breaking in to make the 
arrest. 
[5] Id-Without Warrant;-Compliance With Law-Purpose.-
Every householder, good and bad, guilty or innocent, is en-
titled to the protection designed to secure the common interest 
against un.awful invasion of the home, and Pen. Code, § 844, 
requiring peace officers to demand Ilnd explain their admittance 
before breaking in to make an arrest, is designed to protect 
such fundamental rights, by precluding violent resistance to 
unexplained entries and safeguarding innocent persons who 
may also be present on the premises. 
[6] Id.-Without Warrant-Compliance With Law-When Ex-
cused.-Noncompliance with Pen. Code, § 844, requiring peace 
officers to demand and explain their admittance before break-
ing in to make an arrest, may be excused when the officer 
acts on a reasonable and good faith belief that compliance 
would increase his peril, frustrate an arrest, or permit the 
destruction of evidence, but it may not be generally assumed 
that certain classes of persons subject to arrest are more likely 
than others to do these things, and such belief must be based 
on the facts of the particular case. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Joseph L. Call, Judge. Reversed. 
[3] Entry and search of premises for purpose of arresting one . 
without search warrant, note, 9 A.L.R. 263. 
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Prosecution for possession of heroin. Judgment of convic-
tion reversed. 
Genovevo Rosales, in pro. per., and Joseph C. Battaglia, 
under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James, 
Assistant Attorney General, and Brian Amer, Deputy Attor-
ney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment of 
conviction of possession of heroin. (Health & Saf. Code, 
§ 11500.) The prosecution was based on the discovery of 
heroin on defendant's person at the time of his arrest. 
Defendant contends that the heroin was obtained by an 
unconstitutional search and seizure by the arresting officers. 
Defendant and Fred Berru were arrested in a house in the 
Pacoima area of Los Angeles County. They were apprehended 
by Parole Officer Damerell, San Fernando Police Officer Bar-
barick, and two other police officers. Officer Barbarick had 
received information that defendant and Berru were arrang-
ing sales of heroin by telephone at the house where they were 
arrested. He got in touch with Parole Officer Damerell and 
learned that both suspects were parolees who had violated 
their paroles by failure to report and that the Adult Au-
thority had suspended defendant's parole and issued an all 
points bulletin for his arrest. The officers then went to the 
house to arrest defendant for parole violation. Officers Bar-
barick and Damerell went to the front door, and the other 
officers covered the back of the house. Before entering, one 
officer saw Berru through a front bedroom window and 
another officer saw defendant through the front screen door. 
Defendant was sitting on a couch with his back to the door. 
Officers Barbarick and Damerell quickly entered the house 
and accosted defendant. Just before they arrested defendant 
they passed a girl and told her that they were police officers 
but they did not announce their purpose or demand entry 
before going into the house. 
There is some evidence that the girl was related to Berru, 
but there is no evidence of her age, or whether she lived at the 
house, was visiting or just arriving for a visit. It does not 
appear whether the officers were in uniform. Damerell was not 
the parole officer of either Berru or Rosales, and there is no 
evidence that either knew who he or the other officers were. 
1'. , 
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Damerell testified that before he entered the house he believed 
that the screen door was closed but that the wooden door was 
open.1 
[Ia] Although the prosecution did not elicit sufficient 
details of Officer Barbarick's information on defendant's cur-
rent narcotics activities to show he had reasonable cause to 
'believe that defendant was guilty of a new narcotics offense, 
defendant's arrest was justified by the suspension of his 
parole and the order of the Adult Authority that he be 
returned to custody. (Pen. Code, §§ 3060, 3061.) It also 
appears that before they entered the house, the officers had 
reasonable cause to believe that defendant was there. The 
crucial question, therefore, is whether the officers' failure to 
explain their purpose and demand admittance as required by 
~ection 844 of the Pcnal Code:! vitiated the arrest. We hold 
that it did. 
[2] Vie note at the outset that the ofiict:'r::;' identification of 
themselves to the girl did not constitute substantial compli-
ance with section 844. 'l'hat section requires that an officer 
explain his purpose before demanding admitta11ce, not merely 
that he identify himself as an ofiicer. "'fhe burUen of making 
an express announcement [of purpose) is certainly slight." 
(Miller V" United States (1958) 357 U.S. 301, 309 [2 L.Ed.2d 
1332,1338,78 S.Ct.1l90).) 
Such identification alone could constitute substantial com-
pliance with section 844 only if the surrounding circum-
stances made the officers' purpose clear to the occupants or 
showed that a demand for admittance would be futile. 
[Ib] There is nothing in the record to show that any of the 
occupants or even the girl knew that the officers' purpose was 
to arrest the defendant or understood that they were demand-
ing admittance.3 
IDefendant testified that there was no screen door and that the wooden 
door was closed. 
We note that Police Offieer Olsen testified at the preliminary hearing 
that the girl was stopped as she entered the house and that she opened 
fhc door for the offieera aft.er thcy had i<1entified themselves. This evi-
dence was not before the trial court when it determined the validity of 
the cntry. since the defeudnnt electe<1 not to IlrOcecd on tile pr('liminary 
hearing retord. 
2" '1'0 make an arrest ... in all cases a peace-officer. may break open 
the door or window of the house in whieh the pel'son to be arrested is, or 
in whidl they have reasonable groun<1s for believing him to be. after 
having demanded admittance and explained the purpose for which admit-
tance is desired." 
SIn People ". Limon (1067) 255 Cal.App.2d 519 [63 Cal.Rptr. 91]. 
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[3] The Attorney General contends that since the officers 
did no more than open an unlocked screen door and walk in, 
no "breaking" within the meaning of the statute occurred. 
'Ve do not agree with this contention. Although the common 
law rule was first articulated to regulate entry by force, it is 
not limited to entries effected by physical violence. Section 
844 is a codification of the common law. (People v. Maddox 
(1956) 46 Ca1.2d 301, 306 [394 P.2d 6].) At the very least, it 
covers unannounced entries that would be considered breaking 
as that term is used in defining common law burglary. 
(Rest.2d Torts (1965) § 206, com. b; Blakey, The Rule of 
Annollncement and Unlawful Entry: Miller v. United States 
and Ker v. California (1964) 112 D.Pa.L.Rev. 499, 505; 
Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant (1924) 22 Mich.L.Rev. 
798,806.) As so defined, no more is needed "than the opening 
of a door or window, even if not locked, or not even latched. 
Pulling open a screen door held closed only by a spring is 
sufficient." (R. Perkins, Criminal Law (1957) 149, 150.)4 
[Ie] Since in the present case the only evidence before the 
trial court showed that the officers entered by opening a 
closed, unlocked door, the prosecution did not discharge; its 
burden of establishing the legality of the entry. (See People 
v. Roberts (1956) 47 Ca1.2d 374, 377 [303 P.2d 721] ; People 
v.Car·swell (1959) 51 Ca1.2d 602,607 [335 P.2d 99].) 
[4] The fact tbat defendant was a parole violator deemed 
the defendant had seen the officers and knew their identity and that the 
announcement would have been a futile gesture. No such inference can 
be drawn in .this c.ase. 
4The Attorney General has cited several California cases in support of 
his contention that an entry by opening a closed, unlocked door is not a 
breaking. People v. Barallko (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 189, 194 [20 Cal. 
Rptr. 139], and People v. Chacon (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 7~9, 743 r35 
CaJ.Rptr. 799], involved entry aiter the deil'ndant or a third person had 
voluntarily opened the door. In People v. Littlejohn (1957) 148 Cal. 
App.2d 786, 790 [307 P.2d 425], the ofi1cers showed their badges and 
placed the two defendants under arrest while facing them through a 
screen door, and then opened the screen door. The announcement and 
identificatioll were made before entry and the statute was eomplied with. 
To the extent that People v. Feeley (1960) 179 Cal.App.2<1 ]00, 10:; [3 
Cal.Rptr. 529], is contrary to our holding herein, it is disapproved. The 
federal courts are in diRagreement as to the interpretation to be given 
the similar federal statute. (18 U.S.C. § 3109.) At one extreme are cases 
indicating that any entry withont permission is a br('akillg. (E.g., 11 air 
v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1961) 289 F.2d 894, 89.7 [110 App.D.C. 153].) 
At the opposite extreme is Sabbath v. United States. (9th Cir. 1967) 
380 F.2d J08, 111, certiorari granted, 389 U.S. 1003 f19 L.Ed.~d 598, 
88 S.('t. 570], which sanctioned (,!ltry by oncllillg a clnsed, 1111loo.k('<1 
door. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has given the sam!' 
interpretation to section 844. (William,. v. United States (9th Cir. J9:;9) 
273 1'.2d 78], 793·794.) In the present case it is unneeessary to decide 
whether any entry without permission is a hreaking. 
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an "escape and fugitive from justice" (Pen. Code, § 3064) 
did not excuse noncompliance with section 844, for the Legis-
lature has expressly provided tl1at an order to retake a parolee 
must be executed "in like manner as ordinary criminal 
process" (Pen. Code, § 3061). Even an escape from custody, 
however, does not alone justify entrance into a house to make 
an arrest without explanation of purpose and demand for 
admittance. (Pen. Code, § 855; see also Pen. Code, § 1531 ; 
People v. A.rellano (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 389, 390-392 [48 
Cal.Rptr. 686]; People v. Stephens (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 
113,114-117 {57 Cal.Rptr. 66].) 
[5] Section 844 is designed to protect fundamental rights. 
"Decisions in both the federal and state courts have recog-
nized, as did the English courts, that the requirement is of the 
essence of the substantive protections which safeguard indi-
vidual liberty." (Ker v. Oalifornia (1962) 374 U.S. 23, 49 
[10 L.Ed.2d 726, 747, 83 S.Ot. 1623], Brennan, J. dissenting.) 
The statute reflects more than concern for the rights of 
those accused of crime. It serves to preclude violent resistance 
to unexplained entries and to protect the security of innocent 
persons who may also be present on premises where an arrest 
is made:! "Weare duly mindful of the reliance that society 
must place for achieving law and order upon the enforcing 
agencies of the criminal law. But insistence on observance by 
law officers· of traditional fair procedural requirements is, 
from the long point of view, best calculated to contribute to 
that end. However much in a particular case insistence upon 
such rules may appear as a technicality that inures to the 
benefit of a guilty person, the history of the criminal law 
proves that tolerance of short-cut methods in law enforcement 
impairs its enduring effectiveness. The requirement of prior 
notice of authority and purpose before forcing entry into a 
home is deeply rooted in our heritage and should not be given 
grudging application .... Every householder, the good and 
the bad, the guilty and the innocent, is entitled to the protec-
tion designed to secure the common interest against unlawful 
Ii" The law of ELgland, which is founded on reason, never authorises 
such outrageous acts as the breaking open every door and lock in a man's 
house without any declaration of the authority undcr which it is done. 
Such conduct must tend to create fcar and dismay, and breaches of the 
peace by provoking resistance. This doctrine would not only be attended 
with great mischief to the persons against whom process is issued, but 
to other persons, also, since it must equally hold good in cases of process 
upon escape, where the party has taken refuge in the house of a 
stranger." (Heath, J., in Ratcliffe v. Burton (1802) 3 Bos. & Pul. 223, 
230,127 Eng. Rep. 123. 126·127.) . 
) 
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invasion of the house. The petitioner could not be lawfully 
arrested in his home by officers breaking in without first giv-
ing him notice of their authority and purpose. Because the 
petitioner did not receive that notice before the officers broke 
the door to invade his home, the arrest was unlawful, and the 
evidence seized should have been suppressed." (Miller v. 
United States (1958) 357 U.S. 301, 313-314 [2 L.Ed.2d 1332, 
, 1340-1341, 78 8.Ct. 1190]; cf. Ker v. California, supra, 374 
U.S. 23, 40-41 [10 L.Ed.2d 726, 742-743], where "exigent 
circumstances" excused compliance with the notice and de-
mand requirements.) 
[6] Noncompliance with section 844 may nevertheless be 
excused when the officer acts on a reasonable and good faith 
belief that compliance would increase his peril, frustrate an 
arrest, or permit the destruction of evidence. Such a belief, 
however, must be based on the facts of the particular case. It 
cannot be justified by a general assumption that certain 
classes of persons subject to arrest are more likely than others 
to resist arrest, attempt to escape, or destroy evidence. (Peo-
ple v. Gastelo (1967) 67 Ca1.2d 586, 588 [63 Cal.Rptr. 10, 
432 P.2d 706] and cases cited.) 
[Id] The Attorney General contends that the officers were 
excused from compliance with section 844 to prevent defend-
ant's escape. The facts do not support this contention. Four 
officers went to the house and covered its front and back. 
Before entering they saw both defendant and Berru and 
observed no suspicious activity. Compliance with section 844 
would have afforded defendant and Berru a few seconds at 
most to take evasive action. There is no evidence that would 
justify a belief that such compliance would have increased the 
officers' peril, frustrated the arrest, or resulted in the 
destruction of evidence. 
Since the entry was unlawful, the search of defendant's 
person was illegal. The heroin discovered thereby should 
therefore have been excluded. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Sullivan, J., concurred. 
BURKE, J.-I dissent. The majority, by adopting an 
unduly restrictive view regarding what constitutes exigent 
circumstances excusing strict compliance with the demand 
and explanation requirements of Penal Code section 844,1 
IPenal Code section 844 provides: "To make an arrest .•. a peace 
oftieer, may break open the door or window of the house in which the 
person to be arrested is, or in which they have reasonable grounds for 
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conclude that the officers' violation of that section vitiated the 
arrest and rendered the search illegal. I do not agree and am 
satisfied that the Court of Appeal and trial court in this case 
properly determined, expressly or impliedly, that under the 
circumstances here pr('sent literlll eompliance with the formal 
requirements of section 844 was unnecessary and the officers' 
conduct was reasonabl(·. 
This court pointed out in Pcoplc v. Maddox, 46 Cal.2d 301, 
306 [394 P.2d 6], that the primary purpose of the constitu-
tional gurantees regarding searclles and seizures is to prevent 
unreasonable iuvasions of the l)ecurity of the people in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects, and that compliance with 
the demand and expllluation r('quirellH'nts of section 844 is 
excused if the facts known to the officer before lIis entry were 
l)ufficiellt to support his good fllith bclit·f that compliance 
would have increased his peril or frust.rated the arrest. (See 
also Ker \T. Califm''IIill, 374 HR. 23,37-41 [10 IJ.Ed.2d 726,740. 
743, 83 S.Ct. 1623); Peoplc v. Gasfclo, 67 Ca1.2d 586, 588 
[63 Cul.Rptr. 10, 432 P.2d 706) ; Peoplc v. Cart'illo, 64 Cal.2d 
387, 391 [50 Cal.Rptr. 185, 412 P.2d 377) ; People v. Potter, 
144 Ca1.App.2d 350, 356 (300 P.2d 889).) Here the facts 
known to the officers before their entry amply warranted such 
a belief. 
The police :offieers and the parole officer went to t}le 
llOuse in which they had been informed defendant was liv· 
ing for the purpose of arrestil1g him and his companion 
Berru for parole violation. According to Parole Officer 
Damerell, two of the officers went to the back of the house 
because they were "fearful of fligllt" by defendant and 
Berru. Damerell and Officer Barbarick wcnt to the front door. 
There the wooden door was open, but the screen door was 
closed. Before entering, the officers observed Berru in a bed-
room with his wife or former wife and saw defendant on a 
couch in the living room several feet from the front door with 
llis back to the officers. 
A t the doorway thp officers identified themselves to a girl. 
Damerell testified that "'Ve were moving as quickly as possi. 
ble because we anticipated r a 1 possible es('ape attempt." Bar. 
barick and Damerell entered the house and arrested defendant 
and Berm. A search of defendant's person revealed heroin. 
According to defendant, it was dark outside at the time of the 
,arrest. 
believing him to be, after having' demanded admittallce and explained 
the purpose for which admittance is desired." 
) 
Information obtained by the officers from the Santa Bar-
bara parole office regarding defendant's prior criminal record 
and of his and Berru's having absconded from parole. 
together with additional matters known to them including in 
part their observations indicating that defendant and Berru 
were both in the same llouse in separate rooms, fully justified 
a belief that defendant and Berru would resist arrest or 
resume their flight if atrorded any opportunity to do so. Sur-
prise was manifestly important in minimizing danger to the 
officers and preventing escape by the two parole absconders. 
In my opinion the Court of Appeal in the present case 
properly concluded tbat •• The officers. by their prompt and 
efficient actions, violated no basic constitutional or statutory 
guarantee by getting inside of thc house, where they ,vere 
entitled to be, more quickly than they would have had they 
complied" strictly with the formal provisions of section 844. 
I would affirm the judgment. 
McComb, J. t and Mosk, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied March 28, 
1968. McComb, J., Mosk, J., and Burke, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
